The higher legislative success of parliamentary governments relative to presidential governments has been used to argue that legislative success is driven by parliamentary governments' superior agenda power or their control of legislative majorities. We show that this approach is at odds with some of the empirical regularities across and within political systems. We then propose a legislative bargaining model to elucidate this puzzle. In the model the policies of a con…dence-dependent parliamentary government enjoy more predictable support from governing coalition members because their short-term policy goals are less important than the government's survival. Coalition support is stronger when the government has more agenda power and is weaker with a larger ruling coalition. We explore the empirical implications of these …ndings and their consequences for the comparative study of legislative institutions.
Introduction
The question of how constitutional features in ‡uence political behavior and performance is central in the comparative study of governments. Among democratic political systems, understanding the di¤erences between presidential and parliamentary constitutions has been a main focus of research (e.g. Shugart To evaluate the di¤erent theories of how presidential and parliamentary democracies function we need to assess their ability to account for important variations in observable behavior.
Legislative success is one such observable outcome that is systematically di¤erent between parliamentarism and presidentialism. A legislative success rate is the frequency with which bills proposed or endorsed by the executive government are passed by the legislature in a given legislative session. 1 Parliamentary governments enjoy signi…cantly higher success rates than presidential governments. Yet, well-known theories of parliamentary vs. presidential systems are virtually silent on the issue of legislative success. Tabellini (1997, 2000) focus on di¤erences in accountability and public spending patterns. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) explain why coalitions in parliamentary systems are relatively stable across policy issues, compared to those in presidential systems. Linz (1994) emphasizes di¤erences in the ‡uidity of transitions between consecutive governments, and draws conclusions about the two systems'risk of democratic instability. Tsebelis (2002) makes observations about gridlock and interest group in ‡uence by studying di¤erences in the set and distribution of veto players in the two systems.
Which features of parliamentary governments make them more successful in passing legislation?
The existing literature (see e.g. Saiegh 2009 ) suggests that government legislative success originates either in its superior agenda power, or its control of a legislative majority, for instance through disciplined partisan support. In this paper we notice that while cross-county data does seem consistent with these two hypotheses, within-country data mostly casts doubt on their robustness.
We propose a model of presidential and parliamentary legislative bargaining that reconciles crosssystem and within-system empirical patterns. The model sheds light on the institutional drivers of legislative success. We …nd that the con…dence requirement, a de…ning feature of parliamentary governments, can explain di¤erences in legislative success across systems, even after controlling for 1 We allow for endorsements in addition to formal proposals because the president may lack formal power of legislative initiative, e.g. U.S., in which case he needs to propose bills through legislative agents. The yearly Congressional Quarterly Almanac, for instance, provides lists of legislative proposals "endorsed" by the current president. agenda power and majority control. 2 At the same time our model demonstrates how in a dynamic setting agenda power and majority control are orthogonal to presidential success, and how, in contrast to the commonly held views, agenda power and majority control have opposing e¤ects for parliamentary governments. These results corroborate observed data patterns. The paper's contribution is three-fold: (i) it provides new insights into the logic of parliamentarism and presidentialism by supplying a new comparative theory able to explain their legislative success rates, an outcome overlooked by previous theories of the two political systems; (ii) it provides arguments why the success rate is an imperfect proxy for executive agenda power or majority control; and (iii) it generates testable hypotheses beyond success rates, providing further guidance for empirical work in this area. More generally, our results suggest that sequential bargaining models provide a promising modeling framework for the comparative study of legislatures.
We start by reviewing empirical patterns of legislative success. In the process we point out how some of these data challenge the robustness of the two existing explanations of success rates.
Legislative Success of Parliamentary and Presidential Governments
The …rst motivating example is the comparison between the U.K. (parliamentary) and the U.S.
(presidential) government. As can be seen in …gures 1 and 2, the Prime Minister's average legislative success rate in the U.K. over 1995-2003 was 94 percent, while the U.S. average from Eisenhower's …rst term to Bush 43rd's …rst term was only 68 percent. 3 If attention is restricted to "substantial" legislation the legislative success rate in the U.S. drops to 54 percent (Edwards et al. 1997) .
A natural inclination may be to attribute this gap to di¤erences in party discipline. Yet, other data do not seem to support this explanation. In Figure 3 we add two more cases: Germany and Argentina. Both countries use essentially the same electoral system (closed-list proportional representation) and both countries exhibit very high levels of party discipline. 4 Yet, despite tight party discipline, Argentine governments'legislative success rates are low, in fact even lower than in 2 See Lijphart (1999) . The con…dence requirement in our model re ‡ects its two facets present in parliamentary constitutions: …rst, the legislature can prevent the ruling coalition from governing (no-con…dence vote), and second, the ruling coalition itself steps down if one of its major policy initiatives is defeated (con…dence vote procedure). 3 The Hansard Record for the U.K. Parliament only reports data after 1995. 4 See Jones (2002) for Argentina, Schindler (1994) and Saalfeld (1995) for Germany. How else can we explain these di¤erences? Two hypotheses dominate thinking on this issue: agenda power and majority control. According to the agenda power view parliamentary governments feature more centralization of agenda power in the cabinet, in some cases to the point of excluding non-cabinet legislators; a monopoly on agenda power will then naturally result in higher success rates since it is more di¢ cult to introduce alternatives to the government's initiatives. 6 This view can be supported by observing the higher success of bills introduced by cabinet members relative to those introduced by private members or legislative parties (e.g. Andeweg and Nijzink 1995, Mustapic 2002 ). In presidential systems one can …nd cases, however, that are inconsistent with this intuition.
Presidential Success
In post-authoritarian Chile, for example, presidents have had the constitutional prerogative to 5 Although Cheibub et al. (2004) do not directly control for electoral system type they do report some indirect e¤ects. For example, single party governments (as would be typical for plurality rule systems) have higher legislative success rates than coalition governments in both presidential and parliamentary regimes. 6 For an assessment of agenda power in parliamentary democracies see Döring (1995) . introduce bills with urgency (urgencia), giving them priority consideration by the Chilean Congress and so considerably enhancing the president's agenda power. However, during the 1990-1993 Aylwin administration, when a total of 637 initiatives were introduced by the president, 375 of whom with urgency, success rates for the two types of bills were virtually the same (see Table 2 ).
According to the majority control view parliamentary governments need to rely on the support of a majority at all times ("mutual dependence"). 7 Presidential governments do not depend on a legislative majority to remain in power, since they are elected independently from congress ("mutual independence"). Conceptually, assuming equal levels of party discipline, this institutional di¤erence should a¤ect legislative success only in cases where a president leads a minority government that lacks the support of the legislative majority -leading to gridlock and low success rates. 8 This executive-legislative relationship simply cannot occur under parliamentarism (Cheibub et al. 2004 ).
Evidence suggests, however, that majority control alone is not su¢ cient for legislative success either. For parliamentary systems the majority control view is challenged by data presented by Cheibub et al. (2004) that shows that success rates of small-majority governments is not smaller than success rates of large governing coalitions. In the U.S. this issue has been extensively discussed in the context of divided versus uni…ed government. Until recently, conventional wisdom had suggested that a uni…ed government -presidency and Congress controlled by the same partywould be far more successful in pushing through its agenda. Mayhew (1991) , however, showed that this intuition is not borne out by data from the U.S. Congress. Controlling for other relevant variables, divided government has no signi…cant e¤ect on the amount of important legislation that is enacted. One possible explanation for this outcome might be a compensation e¤ect: faced with a less like-minded legislative majority, 9 a strategic president might moderate his policy proposals in order to maintain a reasonable chance of changing the status quo.
Mayhew's …ndings, however, apply to the number of signi…cant bills passed; is does not directly speak to the issue of legislative success, de…ned in this paper as the likelihood that a bill endorsed by the president passes. The latter case was analyzed by Edwards et al. (1997) . They construct a 7 This majority may be implicit as in the case of minority cabinets. See Diermeier and Merlo (2000) for a formal analysis. 8 A related argument is formalized in a political agency model by Vlaicu (2009) . There separated monitoring of executive and legislature -speci…c to presidential systems -causes policy gridlock, while hierarchical monitoringspeci…c to parliamentary systems -increases agreement between monitor (legislature) and decision-maker (executive). 9 For instance, as a result of losing control of Congress in a midterm election. This does not seem to be just an U.S. phenomenon. In Mexico after President Zedillo party's (the PRI) lost its majority in 1997, the president's legislative success rate dropped only marginally.
This was despite the fact that the number of president-initiated bills fell by a factor of …ve (Nacif 2002 ). 12 Together these …ndings suggest that both hypotheses (agenda power and majority control) seem incomplete. Within countries over time legislative success rates simply do not correlate well with either government agenda power or government control of legislative coalitions. Where does this leave us? Our review of existing research yields the following …ndings:
1. There are signi…cant and substantial di¤erences in legislative success rates across systems.
Parliamentary governments have consistently higher legislative success rates compared to presidential governments.
2. There is little evidence that executive agenda power or loyal legislative majorities a¤ect the executive's legislative success within presidential systems or parliamentary systems.
In this paper we argue that di¤erences in legislative success rates are fundamentally consequences of di¤erences in legislative uncertainty, not executive power. In current presidential vs.
1 0 The president's position was determined based on the Congressional Quarterly 's yearly Almanacs, New York Times commentaries, and presidential documents. 1 1 They justify this lack of e¤ect of divided government on the president's legislative success by arguing that "the responsibilities and expectations of the modern presidency force the chief executive to support a wide range of policy proposals under both divided and uni…ed government, providing ample opportunities for failure in both contexts," and "divided government is only one of the obstacles that legislation faces on the path of enactment." (Edwards et al. 1997 ). 1 2 One explanation for this data, put forward by Nacif (2002) , resonates with the compensation e¤ect alluded to above: "Apparently, presidential response to the loss of the PRI's majority was institutionally induced self-restraint and accomodation. The chief executive refrained from initiating legislation when organizing multiparty coalitions was too costly. At the same time, the PRI allowed opposition parties to take greater part in law making in exchange for their cooperation in passing executive-initiated legislation." (p. 282) parliamentary models, built around a perfectly informed agenda setter, legislative success would always be guaranteed because the setter will simply adjust his proposal to the point where it just buys o¤ the cheapest majority. The challenge is to develop a model where legislative uncertainty varies with the institutional environment (presidential versus parliamentary constitutions) while holding constant the executive's proposal power and the legislature's policy preferences.
This paper proposes such a model. It builds on the dynamic bargaining approach that was introduced by Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) . Focusing on the composition of legislative coalitions their model is not equipped to study success rates because the agenda setter can perfectly observe legislative preferences. The issue at stake there is which legislators get coopted in policy coalitions. 13 Our generalization allows for uncertainty about legislators' preferences. This creates a tradeo¤ between the setter's policy rent and his chance of gathering su¢ cient votes. We also model variation in ruling coalition size to study the e¤ect of majority control on legislative success. 14 Studying how institutions resolve voting uncertainty sheds light on the nature of legislative bargaining under presidentialism and parliamentarism. In a presidential system the government's legislative record does not a¤ect its tenure, since both the government and the legislature have …xed terms ("mutual independence"). Agenda setters then have short-term, issue by issue, policy incentives since there are no long-term consequences of legislative defeats. Because of uncertainty about legislators' preferences the legislators that support the government's policy (the policy coalition) today may di¤er from the policy coalition tomorrow. Majority support is then a risky proposition. More executive control need not alleviate this risk. In fact, whether the government has more agenda power or a larger legislative coalition does not a¤ect its success rate, since the agenda setters'incentives are static, based on the policy issue at hand.
In a parliamentary system, on the other hand, the legislative process reduces the uncertainty about both the composition of policy coalitions and the extent of their support. We …nd that this is due to government dependence on legislative con…dence. This institution has two e¤ects, one on ruling coalition members and the other on agenda setters. First, ruling coalition members have a 1 3 This framework has been applied in other models: government formation and stability (Baron 1998 ) and comparative public …nance (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2000) . 1 4 In the Diermeier-Feddersen model ruling coalitions are determined in equilibrium and are always minimal winning. Our model is not intended to explain the formation of these di¤erent ruling coalition types. This a notoriously di¢ cult problem -see Baron (1998) and Diermeier and Merlo (2000) for models of government formation. Rather, we are interested in the e¤ect of coalition size on legislative success. vested interest in the government's legislative success, since their policy rents keep ‡owing as long as their coalition stays in power. Second, since ruling coalition partners are more likely to support the government, agenda setters …nd them cheaper to buy o¤ with policy bene…ts. This raises the value of coalition membership even further. Put together, these two e¤ects create a symbiotic, mutually-advantageous, relationship between agenda setters and ruling coalition members.
The higher the value of ruling coalition membership the lower the government's uncertainty about their legislative support, and the higher the government's legislative success rate. We …nd that under parliamentarism the value of belonging to the ruling coalition does depend on the government's power: More agenda power multiplies the policy rents that coalition members extract from the opposition; A larger ruling coalition, however, spreads out the rents over more coalition partners, decreasing the stake of each individual member, and with it their support.
These institutional e¤ects elucidate the above empirical puzzle by revealing how agenda power and majority control function di¤erently within each system. They also produce new testable predictions. We characterize di¤erences in the trend and variance of legislative success between systems. The model can also rationalize the preponderance of targeted transfers ("pork") in presidential systems (cf. Persson and Tabellini 2003) . We can also account for the di¤erence in success rates among the two legislative procedures used in the German Parliament. After formally describing the model and analyzing its equilibrium outcomes we discuss these implications in more detail. This is followed by a brief conclusion.
The Model
Consider a legislature composed of n + 1 legislators, where n is even and n 2. The legislature is elected in period T and meets in periods T 1; T 2; :::; 1 to make policy; this …nite sequence of periods is called a legislative session. 15 In every policy period t 2 fT 1; T 2; :::; 1g the policy issue is an allocation s t = s 1 t ; s 2 t ; :::; s 0 for all j and t. 1 5 Periods are numbered in reverse order because the equilibrum is found through mathematical induction on the number of periods t left in the game.
Preferences
Each legislator has sel…sh risk-neutral preferences -he cares only about his own share of the dollar:
; for all j = 1; 2; :::; n + 1:
(
Decisionmaking in a policy period has the following structure: (i) an agenda setter proposes a bill b t ;
(ii) if a majority of legislators approves the proposal, that allocation is implemented; (iii) otherwise, a random reversion allocation X t = X 1 t ; X 2 t ; :::; X n+1 t is implemented, where n+1 X j=1 X j t = 1 and
0 for all j and t. Thus:
Over time reversion allocations are iid draws from a probability distribution with full support over the simplex n : 16 Each legislator observes his own reversion value, but cannot observe others' reversion values. The random reversion point captures the agenda setter's uncertainty over how much support he can count on for a given piece of legislation. 17 The time-independence assumption means that policy issues arise exogenously. 18 This policy environment can be interpreted in two ways. First, the policy issues tackled by this legislature are distributional, and the agenda setter is simply uncertain about other legislators' preferences. Second, the model could also capture legislating over spatial issues, with known ideal point orderings, but uncertainty over the relative support for a given piece of legislation. The bill b t then serves as side payments, or pork, to shore up support for that piece of legislation.
While distributional considerations are common in legislative politics, the real motivation for assuming this particular type of political con ‡ict is symmetry. We need an environment with perfect 1 6 By full support we mean that every point in n = (
has the property that all its open neighborhoods, however small, have positive probability measure. The role of this assumption is to create a benchmark where the agenda setter's degree of uncertainty about legislative preferences is all-encompassing.
symmetry so we can e¤ectively argue that outcomes are driven by legislative institutions, rather than by arbitrary patterns of preference a¢ nities. In a purely spatial setup (say, unidimensional) the e¤ect of legislative institutions would have to be disentangled from the e¤ect of policy preferences.
We assume symmetry not only in preferences, but also in reversion allocations and tie-breaking rules.
Assumption 1 Symmetry in reversion allocations
The reversion allocation X t is drawn each period from a symmetric probability distribution over the simplex n . By symmetry we understand that for any measurable subset X of n and any permutation '( ) of the components of vector X t :
Assumption 2 Symmetry in tie-breaking rules If an agenda setter is indi¤ erent among several possible proposals, he will choose one of these randomly, i.e. without systematically favoring a particular group of legislators.
Timing
The game is played according to one of two legislative protocols: presidential and parliamentary.
These are described graphically in Figures 4 and 5. 19 Both games start in period T with an organizational period when nature picks a ruling coalition G N ; the size of the ruling coalition is denoted by c; where 1 c n + 1: Ruling coalition membership comes with agenda power. Specifically, every ruling coalition member is recognized to be the agenda setter with equal probability 1 c : The ruling coalition is also referred to as the "government." We study two legislative protocols. In a presidential system ( Figure 4 ) the ruling coalition is independent of the legislature. Thus, after a ruling coalition is selected at time T all subsequent periods T 1; T 2; :::; 1 are policy periods where the ruling coalition exerts agenda power. Note that the ruling coalition can be either a minority (if 1 c In a parliamentary system ( Figure 5 ) the ruling coalition is continuously dependent on the legislature's con…dence. Thus, after the initial period-T organization, there is a majority-rule vote on whether the selected ruling coalition can govern. If the ruling coalition wins the con…dence of the legislature, it gains the right to exert agenda power. It maintains its agenda power until it su¤ers a legislative defeat. If a defeat occurs, the next period a reorganization takes place; nature picks a new ruling coalition, and the legislature immediately votes on whether this coalition can govern. 21 How costly is it to spend legislative periods on selecting a ruling coalition? We assume that in organizational periods legislators get a random allocation X t with the same distribution as the reversion allocations in policy periods. Thus each of them expects an equal share of the dollar.
This means that in the parliamentary system legislators who bene…t from the current government lose out from its defeat, whereas those that are worse o¤ with the current government could cut 2 1 For models of government reorganization in parliamentary systems see Stevenson (1999, 2000) . their losses immediately if they could just garner the votes to defeat it. 22 Notice that the model does not assume that parliamentary governments have more agenda power or wield larger majorities, as currently hypothesized in the empirical literature. This allows us to check if the con…dence requirement has an independent e¤ect on legislative success, i.e. while controlling for agenda power and majority size. In other words, we try to identify an additional channel from political system to legislative success, that does not work through agenda power or majority size. Once this channel is characterized, we vary agenda power and majority control and study how their magnitudes change the e¤ect of the political system on legislative success.
These comparative statics exercises should help illuminate the apparent inconsistency between cross-system and within-system data patterns.
Equilibrium Legislative Success
Equilibrium behavior in this model helps us understand how legislative institutions (con…dence requirement, agenda power, and ruling coalition size) a¤ect legislative success. In our setup legislative institutions a¤ect legislative success by shaping the interplay between legislators' policy and political incentives. Policy incentives re ‡ect legislators'static (short-term) concern with their current payo¤s. Political incentives re ‡ect legislators' recognition that membership in the ruling coalition is a source of long-term bene…ts. As we will see, these two types of incentives may be in con ‡ict with one another. We …rst characterize policy incentives by analyzing equilibrium behavior in a single policy period. We then study behavior over multiple periods to capture the long-term dimension of incentives. Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. All proofs of the formal propositions are presented in the Appendix.
Policy Incentives
Consider one policy issue for which the agenda setter is legislator i: What should the agenda setter propose given his uncertainty about his legislative support? The setter knows how much legislators' support costs in aggregate (1 x i ), but does not know how much individual legislators need to be compensated. But he can at least predict that legislator j will support a proposed allocation b if and only if b j X j . In equilibrium the agenda setter makes a proposal that maximizes his expected payo¤:b
where success S is the event that a majority supports the proposal:
where P is a subset of at least n 2 legislators other than the agenda setter. The subset of legislators that end up supporting the bill is the policy coalition. Note that this is an endogenous variable.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium proposalb, and its success probability,
. Also denote by^ = E ^ X i the expected success probability before the policy issue arises. The proposition states that in equilibrium the agenda setter chooses to exploit his agenda power to extract a rent over his reversion value x i by tolerating a positive chance of legislative failure. This makes agenda power valuable: the expected payo¤ of an agenda setter, even before a policy issue arises, denoted i , is better than average, while the expected payo¤ of an ordinary legislator j is below average. (i) The agenda setter extracts a rent over his reversion value:
The agenda setter's expected payo¤ is above average; an ordinary legislator's expected payo¤ is below average: j < 1 n+1 < i : (ii) Legislative success is uncertain if the setter does not already have the support of the legislature:
Legislative success across issues (the legislative success "rate") is interior: 0 <^ < 1:
The logic of this result is straightforward. The agenda setter can guarantee himself x i by proposing a bill where he gets b i = x i : If the bill is successful he gets x i ; if not he still gets x i :
Can he do better? He could try to raise his share while maintaining a positive chance that his bill will pass. As long as uncertainty is su¢ ciently encompassing (full support) this strategy raises his expected payo¤ above average. Only in the unlikely case that the rest of the legislature is behind the agenda setter even without compensation (x i = 1), the distributional con ‡ict disappears, and legislative success is no longer an issue.
In short, this proposition claims that the agenda setter's policy incentives create an expected payo¤ gap between the agenda setter and ordinary legislators, as well as uncertainty about the …nal legislative product. How are policy payo¤s and legislative uncertainty a¤ected by legislative institutions? Answering this question requires a dynamic setting where policy (short-term) incentives interact with political (long-term) incentives.
Presidential Government
Presidential systems are de…ned by the "mutual independence" of the legislature and the executive. (ii) Legislative success is uncertain every period, varies from issue to issue, and is independent across issues.
Over the entire legislative session the government's legislative success rate is interior:
The key to understanding presidential legislative performance is to focus on the incentives of the agenda setters and ordinary legislators. In any given policy period an ordinary legislator votes for the agenda setter's proposal based on his short-term interests, because a failed bill does not change the balance of political power in the legislature -the same ruling coalition will make policy in all future periods. Thus, by symmetry, the agenda setter is indi¤erent between making o¤ers to ruling coalition and opposition members. Since his own future expected payo¤s also do not depend on the fate of the current bill, his proposal will depend only on current period payo¤s. Policy coalitions, therefore, have uncertain composition, can be majoritarian or super-majoritarian, and may or may not overlap with the ruling coalition.
In other words, legislative behavior every period is driven by short-term policy incentives, the same ones we characterized in Proposition 1. Legislative success remains uncertain every period, and depends on the overall level of support in that particular period, as captured by the agenda setter's reversion value x i t : The overall legislative success rate remains at its short-term level sincê
How is legislative success a¤ected by an increase in the government's agenda power or in the has no impact on its legislative success rate. These observations are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the presidential game variation in agenda power or ruling coalition size have no e¤ ect on the government's legislative success rate.
This result is consistent with the above-mentioned …ndings that within presidential countries one cannot empirically reject the hypothesis that agenda power and majority control are irrelevant for government legislative success. We further discuss this issue below, after we derive corresponding results for parliamentary governments.
Parliamentary Government
Parliamentary systems are de…ned by a relation of "mutual dependence" between the legislature and the executive. The government's ruling coalition survives as long as it maintains the con…dence of the legislature. Con…dence manifests itself in two ways. In the …rst place, the ruling coalition has to be approved by parliament (by avoiding a no-con…dence motion). Second, during the course of a legislative session the ruling coalition itself can commit to step down if it su¤ers a legislative defeat (by invoking a con…dence vote procedure).
It might seem that because of its more hazardous position the ruling coalition in a parliamentary system would be more "careful" in proposing legislation, to avoid a legislative defeat (Heller 2001 ).
This intuition is only partially correct. In fact, we show that the government need not compromise on its policy goals in order to maximize its legislative success.
It has long been noted that the con…dence vote procedure -the second facet of the con…dence requirement -enhances the bargaining power of the prime minister vis-a-vis his ruling coalition.
The threat of coalition break-up causes the coalition to stick together. 23 Thus the government prefers to commit to seek con…dence in order to exploit this strategic advantage. 24 The con…dence vote procedure has been shown to create coalitional cohesion. We show how it creates legislative success as well.
Proposition 4
In the parliamentary game equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) Only majority coalitions are allowed to govern:ĉ n 2 + 1: (ii) Policy coalitions form around the ruling coalition in all periods except the last.
(iii) Expected legislative success^ t is higher at the beginning of a long legislative session, and declines toward^ as the legislative session approaches its end. 2 3 A formalization of this argument is in Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) who apply the logic of legislative con…dence to the comparative study of coalitional voting cohesion. 2 4 In most parliamentary systems this commitment is mutually understood even if the procedure is not actually invoked. As Cheibub et al. (2004) document, there have been a few parliamentary governments where there was a "slack" between defeating the government on a particular issue and voting it out of o¢ ce. However, these cases are exceptions to the rule. See that article for speci…c examples.
The equilibrium outcome under parliamentarism di¤ers sharply from the one under presidentialism. The root cause is the di¤erence in long-term incentives. In a parliamentary system the failure of a bill has not only policy but also political consequences. In terms of policy, a failed bill means lost policy bene…ts for the agenda setter, just like under presidentialism. Politically, however, a failed bill brings down the ruling coalition. This a¤ects the future payo¤s of all legislators.
Consequently, in every policy period future expected payo¤s play a large role. To measure this dynamic factor we de…ne the concept of a net continuation value (NCV): the di¤erence in future expected payo¤s between a legislative success and a legislative failure:
where V j t (S t ) is the sum of expected payo¤s if the current ruling coalition is successful at t. Intuitively, a legislator's NCV measures his long-term bene…t from supporting the current government.
NCVs are a zero-sum concept. If some legislators bene…t from the ruling coalition the rest must lose: n+1 X j=1 j t = 0. For this reason, a ruling coalition that does not have a majority of seats cannot gain a mandate to govern, unless being part of the ruling coalition is detrimental. In our setup that cannot be the case because agenda power is valuable (by Proposition 1).
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 reveals how the political incentives created by the con…dence requirement a¤ect the formation of policy coalitions. Ruling coalition members vote together, as members of a disciplined party would, 25 whereas the opposition votes against the government.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 4 follow from two observations. First, NCVs of ruling coalition members are larger than opposition members'. Moreover, they increase in the length of the legislative session, while the opposition's decrease. This is because ruling coalition members have more time to extract policy bene…ts from the minority opposition. Second, equilibrium legislative success strictly increases in government members'NCV, when this is large enough:
To illustrate the …rst claim Figure 6 plots the sequences of NCVs for the special case of three 2 5 Athough this disciplined behavior is not based on "pressure" from party leaders, as is usually conjectured in the literature ( legislators and uniform uncertainty. 26 In this example six periods before the end of the legislative session legislative success is guaranteed, and, not shown in the picture, nine periods before the end of the game a ruling coalition member supports the government unconditionally, purely on political grounds: G t > 1 for t 9: In this example, the corresponding NCV's for the presidential system are G = 1=24 for each of the two government members and O = 1=12 for the opposition member. The expected legislative success rate under presidentialism is^ = 1=2 every period.
The logic of the second claim -success strictly increasing in government NCVs -is as follows.
An increase in majority support G has two e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is that it improves the prospects for success of a given bill, since ruling coalition members stand to lose more long-term from a legislative failure and so are now "cheaper" to bring on board. The indirect e¤ect is that the setter may choose to be opportunistic and "cash in" some of this windfall support by retaining more bene…ts b i t for himself and thus reducing success. Overall, the e¤ect on success can be nil. However, as the agenda setter's NCV becomes larger success becomes increasingly important because of the large advantage of staying in the ruling coalition in the future. In other words, long-term political incentives start to dominate short-term policy incentives, and the executive optimally pursues higher success.
Technically, this second claim rests on two assumptions.
Assumption 3 More majority support does not decrease equilibrium legislative success:
where G is the NCV of a ruling coalition member.
This assumption requires that when faced with an increase in majority support the agenda setter does not want to reduce his o¤ers to such an extent that it reduces the bill's prospects of passage.
Whether this assumption holds ultimately depends on the properties of the underlying uncertainty: the probability distribution of reversion allocations has to be su¢ ciently ‡at. 27 This weak condition on the agenda setter's equilibrium response to increased support ensures that government NCVs keep growing over time. When this happens success (holding on to a higher and higher NCV)
becomes relatively more important to the agenda setter than short-term bene…ts, and the agenda setter pursues strictly higher legislative success @ @ G^ x; G > 0 for large G . Thus, Assumption 3 helps create a positive correlation between government NCV and legislative success (see Figure   6 ).
The other assumption is a tie-breaking condition. If the ruling coalition is a minority that does not have enough resources to bring some of the majority opposition on board, then the majority opposition is indi¤erent between allowing it to govern (and defeating it next period) and withholding con…dence now.
Assumption 4
If a minority ruling coalition is expected to be ine¤ ective (i.e. zero legislative success) it will not be allowed to govern.
Finally, we can ask how legislative success is a¤ected by an increase in the government's agenda power or in the size of the ruling coalition. The following result answers those questions.
Proposition 5 In the parliamentary game:
(i) More agenda power leads to higher legislative success.
(ii) Larger ruling coalitions have lower legislative success rates.
Part one of the proposition follows directly from the strict monotonicity of government NCVs over time. Increasing agenda power by increasing the number of periods when the government monopolizes the agenda increases government members'NCVs, and with it the equilibrium success probability. In part two of the corollary a larger ruling coalition leads to a reduction in the NCVs of government members, since policy advantages have to be shared among more members. Lower NCVs then lead to less legislative success.
Agenda Power and Majority Control Revisited
The previous two subsections have established a positive e¤ect of parliamentarism's con…dence requirement on government legislative success. At the same time we showed how agenda and coalitional considerations in ‡uence the con…dence e¤ect. How does this relate to the "agenda power" and "majority control" views of legislative success? Can they serve as empirical proxies for legislative success?
The agenda power and majority control hypotheses are summarized in Figure 7 . Their claim is that parliamentarism leads to more government control of both the agenda and of legislative majorities, which in turn enhance the government's legislative success. Our results qualify these two hypotheses in three ways. First, we argue that there is an additional channel for the e¤ect of political system on legislative success, namely the con…dence requirement. Second, we claim that the way the agenda power and majority control channels work depend on the type of political system. Third, we found that the e¤ects of those two institutional variables may have signs di¤erent than those hypothesized in the empirical literature. Our …ndings are summarized in Figure 8 .
We …rst state our main result establishing a causal relationship between political system and legislative success.
Proposition 6
The government's legislative success rate is higher under parliamentarism than under presidentialism, for equal levels of agenda power and majority control.
In presidential systems our model predicts no e¤ects of agenda power or majority control (Propo- These results can guide future empirical studies of legislative success. In particular, our model suggests that the con…dence requirement, agenda power and ruling coalition size are three institutional variables that should enter an empirical speci…cation independently as well as interacted.
Moreover, the e¤ects of the last two are not unambiguously positive, but depend on the presence of the con…dence requirement.
Implications for the Comparative Study of Legislatures
In this section we state our model's testable hypotheses that go beyond success rates and discuss additional implications of our analysis.
Empirical Implications Beyond Success Rates
The model generates other interesting testable hypotheses. We explore …ve additional variables:
the trend and variance of legislative success over the legislative session; the incidence of targeted transfers ("pork") across political systems; and the quantity and substance of government-endorsed legislation.
Trend and Variance. How does legislative success vary over the electoral horizon? For presidential systems, our model predicts no correlation between legislative success and the electoral horizon. This is due to the stationarity of equilibrium behavior (see Proposition 2) . Intuitively the policy process is driven by short term issue-by-issue incentives because there are only short term consequences of an unsuccessful proposal. In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, the failure of a policy proposal can lead to a change in the composition of the governing coalition. This injects political incentives in the policy process whereby coalition members consider both their short term policy interests and their long term political interest i.e. keeping the coalition together. Moreover, the political incentives are stronger the further away is the next election, since this increases the value of belonging to the governing coalition. Therefore, the model predicts that legislative success in parliamentary governments should decrease as the next regularly scheduled election draws nearer.
This …nding bears a striking similarity to a related …nding of increasing hazard rates for cabinets in parliamentary democracies (e.g. Warwick 1994 , Diermeier and Stevenson 1999 . 28 Second are testable hypotheses about the variance in legislative success. Our model implies that at any point in time the variance in legislative success should be higher in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems (Proposition 4(iii)). Parliamentary systems reduce the uncertainty in legislative votes, especially at the beginning of a legislative session. Incidentally, notice how the time series in Figures 1 and 2 and the histograms in Figure 3 are consistent with this hypothesis.
Over time the variance of legislative success is trendless in presidential democracies, but increasing closer to the upcoming elections in parliamentary democracies. These results follow directly from 2 8 The two phenomena, however, are di¤erent. In this paper we are interested in legislative success rates, not government survival rates. Of course, lack of legislative success and cabinet survival may be highly correlated. In our model, for example, the hazard rates for cabinets will indeed increase due to the linkage created by the con…dence requirement. This is due to the fact that the value of being in government is decreasing as the next election approaches. So proposers are more willing to "risk" a governmental collapse. However, this …nding should be con…rmed by integrating our model with the cabinet duration models found in the literature.
propositions 2 and 4.
Targeted Transfers ("Pork") As discussed above the policy issue in our model can be interpreted as transfers made by the agenda setter to legislators'districts to shore up support for a particular piece of legislation. Based on this interpretation our model predicts that presidential systems lead to larger transfers. This is because the persistent uncertainty about available votes is mitigated by agenda setters with targeted bene…ts. In a parliamentary system where political incentives are stronger than policy incentives agenda setters can rely on ruling coalition members' support without the need to deploy large transfers to buy their votes. 29 The preponderance of targeted transfers in presidential systems has been explained in other ways. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) argue that legislators in parliamentary systems face a weaker distributional con ‡ict than legislators in presidential systems because the they have a common interest in keeping the governing coalition together. Thus parliamentary legislatures stimulate collective action while presidential legislatures are more parochial. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) argue that "the presidential system leads to greater provision of constituency service because the president's role in determining national policy causes voters to focus more on local concerns when choosing their legislator." (p. 176) Despite its apparent theoretical robustness, the evidence for this prediction has been hard to …nd, due to both measurement and identi…cation issues (see Persson and Tabellini 2003) . 30 Legislative Output The model also has implications for legislative output. First, legislative productivity -the number of bills passed -is higher under parliamentarism as long as election results ease the formation of majority coalition governments. This is because of its correlation with success: more success implies that more bills introduced by the government pass. Second, our model predicts that executive control over the content of legislation is higher under parliamentarism as well. This is especially true at the beginning of the legislative session where the incentives to preserve the ruling coalition are stronger. Our prediction contrasts with the often-voiced argument claiming that due to its more hazardous political position a parliamentary government is more "careful" in proposing legislation, to avoid a legislative defeat (Heller 2001 ). In our model a majority parliamentary government is both stable and e¤ective in pushing through its agendawithout the need to compromise on policy goals.
Further Issues
The Issue of Commitment. The key di¤erence between the parliamentary and presidential model lies in the shared expectation that a failed bill will lead to the collapse of the government. In parliamentary systems this expectation is sustained by an institutionalized commitment device: the vote of con…dence procedure. One may ask, however, why governing coalitions in presidential systems cannot replicate such commitment endogenously by repeated interaction, formally modeled as an in…nitely repeated game. While creating such a model may be possible, one should note that sustaining a commitment equilibrium will depend on various factors such as the frequency of interaction, the equilibrium punishment etc. that may or may not be present, while the vote of con…dence procedure is constitutionally available. 31 Divided Government. The model directly implies that switches from uni…ed to divided government or vice versa should at most exercise a moderate e¤ect on legislative success (by Proposition 3). A uni…ed Congress should have no more success in passing its laws than a divided one. Note that the "dependent" variable here is legislative success rates as in Edwards et al. (1997) , not lack of legislative productivity (as in Mayhew 1991) or "gridlock" as in Krehbiel (1998) . Similarly, changes in the partisan composition of Congress, committee control, or party leadership should exercise only a modest e¤ect.
Parties vs. Coalitions. It is a common misunderstanding to attribute legislative success to party discipline. This becomes clear once we compare presidential and parliamentary systems that share the same electoral rule, such as Argentina and Germany (see Figure 3 and Table 3 ). Both use closed-list proportional representation and have high levels of voting discipline within parties, yet very di¤erent levels of legislative success. The misunderstanding is based on a confusion between parties and coalitions; it frequently stems from a sole focus on countries with plurality elections that encourage two-party systems (like the U.K. and the U.S.). Any purely party-based explanation necessarily fails to account for the existence of cohesive, successful, multi-party coalitions that will nevertheless compete against each other in the next election. The model does provide an explanation for high levels of intra-party discipline in Britain's
House of Commons compared to the U.S. Congress, despite the fact that both countries use the same plurality electoral system. This discipline, however, originates in legislative, not electoral, incentives. According to the logic of the model coalition-preserving incentives are powerful enough to dominate MPs' incentives to follow district-speci…c interests. Notice that this also creates incentives to compete on a common electoral platform. 32 These political incentives are more muted in the U.S. Congress. 33 German Bicameralism -A Natural Experiment. An interesting natural experiment for testing the implications of the model is provided by the German Constitution. According to this document, bills are to be considered according to one of two di¤erent procedures. Which procedure applies depends on the content of the bill e.g. whether bills have …scal consequences for the German states; in borderline cases the German Supreme Court decides which procedure is constitutional.
According to the …rst procedure the lower house (Bundestag) can unilaterally pass the bill by simple majority (the upper house can at most delay passage). According to the second procedure the upper house (Bundesrat) can veto the lower house's bill. 34 The lower house can override this veto, but only with the same majority that was used in the veto of the original proposal i.e. if the upper house rejected the lower house's bill by a 2/3 margin, the upper house needs to muster a 2/3 3 2 Of course, such an account would need to be modeled explicitly, where the legislative model proposed here could serve as a building block. 3 3 As an application of this logic, our model predicts that the current Conservative -Liberal Democrat coalition in the U.K. should have similar success rates as previous one-party governments. 3 4 Most federal taxation measures are considered under the second procedure.
margin as well to override the veto.
Given the distribution of state government coalitions (many of which contain the federal opposition party) that make up the upper chamber, overrides are usually not an e¤ective option, which leaves the upper house with a virtual veto. Since the government is only accountable to the lower house, the logic of the con…dence requirement rendered above would predict higher success rates for bills introduced according to the …rst procedure. Indeed, the average gap in government success between the two procedures is about 10 percentage points (Schindler 1994 ).
Conclusion
This paper explores the logic of the con…dence requirement, a constitutional feature of parliamentary governments, to understand di¤erences in legislative e¤ectiveness across political systems. In the process it generates a solution to puzzling empirical observations on legislative success rates. On the one hand within a country, most famously the United States, neither institutional di¤erences nor signi…cant shifts in the distribution of seats seem to play a role in explaining legislative success. On the other hand, there is large cross-country variation in legislative success rates between presidential and parliamentary governments.
We suggested an institutional explanation to account for these di¤erences. Our model sheds new light on the nature of legislative policymaking under presidentialism and parliamentarism. The key insights are (i) the con…dence requirement alters the balance between policy and political incentives to reduce the uncertainty in legislative support for the government's legislative initiatives and (ii) government agenda power and majority control have system-dependent e¤ects once dynamic incentives are factored in. We then discussed the empirical implications of these …ndings. In particular, we showed that the model can explain both the null …ndings within systems and the signi…cant cross-country di¤erences in legislative success between presidential and parliamentary systems. The model also yields new predictions. For example, we predict a higher variance in legislative success rates in presidential systems, as well as di¤erences in legislative output.
While our analysis can reconcile the puzzling empirical …ndings that motivated this paper, it needs to be subjected to more comprehensive empirical tests. A major hurdle for conducting empirical tests of our theory is the lack of reliable cross-country data on legislative success rates.
We hope that current data collection e¤orts such as the VoteWorld Project 35 will help resolve this di¢ culty.
Proof of Proposition 1
The goal of this proposition is to characterize legislators'policy incentives in the presence of agenda power. We …rst look at equilibrium outcomes for a known policy issue, and then derive equilibrium properties ex ante, before an issue arises. 36 The agenda setter's problem is:
where success is the event that a majority supports the proposal:
where P is a subset of at least n 2 legislators other than the agenda setter. If we denote the maximal success probability for a given proposal by:
then the agenda setter proposes to retain for himself a share:
If the agenda setter already has guaranteed support in the legislature (x i = 1) then he can make no payouts and still have the bill pass. If legislative support is not guaranteed (x i < 1), the agenda setter can still guarantee himself a payo¤ of x i by proposing a bill with b i = x i : Whether the bill passes or not, he gets x i : Can he do better for himself? The agenda setter faces a tradeo¤ between extracting a larger rent and increasing his success probability. This tradeo¤ is characterized by the …rst-order condition for problem (12):
The setter can do better for himself by extracting a rent (b i > x i ) as long as there is a positive 3 6 The ex ante properties of equilibrium will matter when we move on to the dynamic setting.
chance of success. There do exist bills with these two properties. One is where the setter retains everything for himself but an in…nitesimal " > 0 which he spreads over a majority (minus one).
The handouts can be made small enough that the setter raises his share from x i , and yet, by full support, there remains a positive chance that the compensated majority members'reservation values are all below Can the agenda setter guarantee the success of a bill? Only if he already has the support of a majority (x i = 1). If he does not (x i < 1), then we will show that there is always uncertainty about whether the equilibrium bill has su¢ cient support:^ x i < 1.
When x i < 1 the equilibrium bill extracts a positive rent for the agenda setter. This means that the sum of bill payouts is not su¢ cient to cover the sum of reversion values. By full support, there is always a chance that a majority will not be fully satis…ed with the bill. For instance, even if the setter targets a majority (minus one) with the remaining share it is always possible that this majority happens to be the most expensive and the remaining minority also do not accept a bill that gives them zero because their reversion values are just a notch (" > 0) above zero.
Ex ante, before a policy issue arises, a legislator's expected payo¤ depends on the agenda process.
In the absence of agenda power (e.g. open rule) every legislator expects to be compensated
to support any piece of legislation. If only one legislator has agenda power, however, he expects to make more than the average 1 n+1 , whereas the rest of legislators expect to make less than average. This claim follows from the observation that the sum of expected payo¤s has to equal one i + n j = 1 where:
The ex ante success probability is also between zero and one, because: (i) every equilibrium bill with x i < 1 has a positive chance of success and also of failure, and (ii) policy issues with uncertain legislative support (x i < 1) come up with positive probability, by full support of the distribution of reversion allocations.
Proof of Proposition 2
In a policy period t legislators vote on the current proposal by taking into account current payo¤s s j t as well as future expected payo¤s V j t . However, future expected payo¤s are the same whether the bill passes (success S t ) or fails (failure n S t ):
(t 1)
where G and O are the sets of government and opposition legislators respectively. Thus, only current period payo¤s are factored into voting decisions.
(i) Given this voting behavior, the agenda setter's uncertainty about his legislative support is as in Proposition 1. Ruling coalition members are as likely to support the proposal as opposition members. The agenda setter's proposal takes into account his current and future expected payo¤s, as well as his success probability. Since his future expected payo¤s do not depend on the bill's fate either, his equilibrium proposal depends only on current policy payo¤s, as characterized in Proposition 1. Thereforeb i t x i =b i x i and^ t x i =^ x i for all t 1: Policy coalitions are independent of the ruling coalition, and over time.
(ii) Legislative success remains uncertain every period, and is independent of success in other periods, because it is driven by overall support over that speci…c policy issue. Over all issues, legislative success equals the ex ante success probability in each period:
; which, by Proposition 1, is interior 0 <^ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
The e¤ect of agenda power can be identi…ed by looking at a slight modi…cation of the model. It is immediately apparent that this variation in the government's agenda power has no e¤ect on the government's legislative success rate. Policymaking is based on issue-by-issue incentives whether the agenda is under government control or not. The same holds true for variations in ruling coalition size. Whether the government is in minority (1 c n 2 ) or in majority ( n 2 + 1 c n + 1) has no impact on its legislative success rate.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) The proof of the …rst part is by mathematical induction. We establish two claims: (C1) If T = 2 then a minority coalition is not allowed to govern.
(C2) If a minority coalition is not allowed to govern at T then it is not allowed to govern at T + 1 either.
(i)(C1) By Proposition 1 in the last policy period t = 1 an agenda setter i does better than average and an ordinary legislator does worse than average: j < 1 n+1 < i : Continuation values at T = 2 for government and opposition members are:
which implies that the majority opposition prefers the reversion allocation at t = 1 to a minority coalition.
(i)(C2) Assume that a minority coalition is not allowed to govern at T: Therefore, either
n+1 : Suppose, now, that the game starts at T + 1 with a minority ruling coalition. Suppose, by contradiction, that the minority coalition obtains the con…dence of a majority. Then T is a policy period with a minority governing coalition. There are three possible equilibrium outcomes in policy period T:
n+1 < V G T and with positive probability a majority supports the bill. Then, by Proposition 1, it must be that the agenda setter is better o¤ than average starting at T; since otherwise he will choose to step down: V i T +1 > T n+1 : Also, ruling coalition members j 2 G have to be better o¤ on average, since they are cheaper to buy o¤ than opposition members k 2 O; and so their support is sought …rst: V j T +1 V k T +1 : At T + 1 continuation values are:
which implies that V O T +1 < T n+1 < V G T +1 , so that at T + 1 there is majority opposition to giving con…dence to the minority ruling coalition. Contradiction.
Second, V O T < T 1 n+1 < V G T and no majority opposition member can be brought on board at T , because their NCV is too negative. Then at T + 1 the majority opposition is indi¤erent between allowing the ruling minority to govern (and defeating it next period) and triggering a reorganization now. By Assumption 4 the second alternative is chosen. Contradiction.
n+1 . Then policy incentives at T are identical to policy incentives at t = 1: By Proposition 1, we know that expected payo¤s at T have the property that the agenda setter is better o¤ j < 1 n+1 < i : At T + 1 continuation values are:
(ii) and (iii) Parts two and three of this proposition are established in two steps. First we show that ruling coalition members gain more the longer their majority coalition is in power. Second we show that equilibrium legislative success goes up in government members'NCV when this is large enough.
Step 1) NCVs of government members go up in the length of the legislative session. At t = 1 the agenda setter's problem is: (ii) Increasing the size of the ruling coalition has the opposite e¤ect on success. We show that the sequence of government NCVs decreases. Then, by equation (31), equilibrium success probability is lower each period. . . . Each NCV is strictly smaller with a larger coalition size. In the extreme case c = n +1 (grand coalition) NCVs are zero, so there is no variation in success across periods, just like in the presidential game.
Proof of Proposition 6
Follows directly from Propositions 2-5.
